tl;dr NCC Group and Fox-IT have been tracking a threat group with a wide set of interests, from intellectual property (IP) from victims in the semiconductors industry through to data from the airline industry. In their intrusions they regularly abuse cloud services from Google and Microsoft to achieve their goals. NCC Group and Fox-IT observed … Continue reading Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar
Category: Managed Detection & Response
Building an RDP Credential Catcher for Threat Intelligence
We wanted to build a mechanism to capture all the passwords used (successful or not) against RDP to ascertain potential sources of credential theft and if they are organisation specific. This post provides the background on an approach and the steps to build such a system.
Using AWS and Azure for Cost Effective Log Ingestion with Data Processing Pipelines for SIEMs
Liam Stevenson, Associate Director of Technical Services within NCC Group's Managed Detection & Response division, shows how to derive significant cost efficiencies in SIEM platform consumption with smart log ingestion utilizing pre-processing data pipelines and modern cloud services. Doing so significantly reduces data volumes to the SIEM without loosing the residual value and accessibility of the underlying data.
TA505: A Brief History Of Their Time
Threat Intel Analyst: Antonis Terefos (@Tera0017)Data Scientist: Anne Postma (@A_Postma) 1. Introduction TA505 is a sophisticated and innovative threat actor, with plenty of cybercrime experience, that engages in targeted attacks across multiple sectors and geographies for financial gain. Over time, TA505 evolved from a lesser partner to a mature, self-subsisting and versatile crime operation with … Continue reading TA505: A Brief History Of Their Time
Tool – Windows Executable Memory Page Delta Reporter
One true constant (until someone schools me) is that threat actors need executable memory of some kind to operate from for their endpoint implant even if fleeting. Given this we've released an open source Microsoft Windows Service that aims to facilitate detection of anomalous executable memory
Extending a Thinkst Canary to become an interactive honeypot
In this post we explore how to use the extensible nature of Thinkst Canary to build a high interaction honeypot.
Machine learning from idea to reality: a PowerShell case study
Detecting both ‘offensive’ and obfuscated PowerShell scripts in Splunk using Windows Event Log 4104 This blog provides a ‘look behind the scenes’ at the RIFT Data Science team and describes the process of moving from the need or an idea for research towards models that can be used in practice. More specifically, how known and … Continue reading Machine learning from idea to reality: a PowerShell case study
Experiments in Extending Thinkst Canary – Part 1
The Thinkst Canary is best described as a digital tripwire for physical and virtual environments. It sits there waiting for a threat actor to tip you off they are mooching around your environment. What is less appreciated however is it is extensible with custom user modules. This post is the first in a series detailing our experiments in extending the product.
WastedLocker: A New Ransomware Variant Developed By The Evil Corp Group
Authors: Nikolaos Pantazopoulos, Stefano Antenucci (@Antelox), Michael Sandee and in close collaboration with NCC’s RIFT. About the Research and Intelligence Fusion Team (RIFT):RIFT leverages our strategic analysis, data science, and threat hunting capabilities to create actionable threat intelligence, ranging from IOCs and detection capabilities to strategic reports on tomorrow's threat landscape. Cyber security is an … Continue reading WastedLocker: A New Ransomware Variant Developed By The Evil Corp Group
In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family
Publicly discovered in late April 2020, the Team9 malware family (also known as ‘Bazar’) appears to be a new malware being developed by the group behind Trickbot. Even though the development of the malware appears to be recent, the developers have already developed two components with rich functionality. The purpose of this blog post is to describe the functionality of the two components, the loader and the backdoor.